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ABSTRACT 
Aim/Purpose This case study examines the last-mile logistics model as implemented by Lazada 
Vietnam, as well as the logistics challenges in the local business environment that 
led the e-commerce company to dually employ the inventory/retail model and the 
marketplace model for delivering orders to online customers in Vietnam in search 
of  the way to perfect their last-mile logistics. 
Background For electronic commerce companies aiming to be successful in customer service, 
what academics and practitioners refer to as ‘last-mile logistics’ is the one moment 
of  truth, when deliveries have to be planned tactically and exactly, so that orders 
are delivered to customers at the right time, right place, right quantity, right quali-
ty, and ultimately at the right cost. When deciphering this type of  supply chain, 
i.e., one that is e-commerce- driven, last-mile logistics is the one segment of  the 
product flow that directly interacts with the ultimate customer, but many times is 
the one segment that is the most problematic and less efficient to implement well. 
Lazada Group, a German e-commerce company, discovered the serious complica-
tions of  ‘last-mile logistics’ when they first entered Vietnam in 2013. 
Methodology This case study used qualitative method through interviews with Lazada Vi-
etnam’s management.  
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Contribution The paper explains the challenges incorporating last-mile logistics concept in e-
commerce operation in Vietnam.  
Keywords last-mile logistics, Lazada Vietnam, Lazada Group, retail/inventory model, mar-
ketplace model, Vietnam e-commerce, discussion case 
INTRODUCTION 
December 25th was almost here, and thousands of  American homes waited with anticipation, how-
ever tiny, for Christmas, wishing that their most important holiday of  the year would not be ruined 
with missing presents from late deliveries. Meanwhile, somewhere else in the United States, a last-
minute effort was being orchestrated by logistics giants UPS and FedEx to get packages delivered to 
thousands of  destinations on time, but this most important of  logistics missions each year appeared 
to be challenged by what looked like a tall mountain of  piled-up orders, uncooperative bad weather, 
and an extremely unyielding order cycle time. This was not another Christmas story but exactly what 
was happening in the United States during the long-lasting holidays at the end of  2013, which later 
left thousands of  retailers and transportation service providers with a bundle of  complaints from 
upset customers along with some ‘fire rescue’ apologies from shipping companies. For customers 
auspicious enough to purchase items from Amazon.com, shipping charges were refunded in the 
event of  a late delivery, and for customers who experienced a missing order, even a $20 gift card was 
passed on to them with full compliments of  the house. But something had to give. To envision a 
positive future for their business operations, one free from undesirable logistics issues, Amazon de-
cided to develop its own delivery network despite having to give up quite a bit of  its profits, stressing 
the importance of  what was often referred to in industry and academic circles as “last-mile logistics” 
(Bensinger 2014). And who could fault Amazon for trying to put together and manage a successful 
online shopping store with a business model that took into consideration a customer’s complete 
shopping experience. 
“Last-mile logistics is the last stretch of  a business-to-consumer (B2C) parcel, from the order pene-
tration point (i.e., fulfillment center) to the final consignee’s preferred destination point (e.g., home or 
cluster/collection point), for the reception of  goods” (Lim, Xin, & Srai 2015). Despite this segment 
being just a small link in a series of  links in the trajectory of  the product across various strategic lo-
gistics points for the distribution and sale of  a product in a global supply chain, the irrefutable im-
portance of  last-mile logistics lay in the fact that it was the one and only link interacting directly with 
the final customer, also referred to as the ultimate customer, or consumer. Paradoxically, it remained 
many times the most problematic, most costly and least efficient of  the links, at least when compar-
ing it to the times in the past when the last-mile delivery of  a business dealt principally with the 
transport of  large, heavy high-value items. But that was then, and this was now. With the introduc-
tion of  new web technologies and the explosion of  e-commerce, last-mile logistics drew much atten-
tion from not only online sellers but shipping companies, placing them in a position to either exploit 
a ‘cannot-miss’ opportunity to gain a tactical, competitive advantage, or else succumb to the dire con-
sequences from missing out on sales and profits at the hands of  rival companies who would not skip 
on the golden prospect to improve their business operations. In this one of  the fiercest and most 
competitive arenas, you either had to be the hunter or be the hunted. Consequently, ecommerce 
companies had to think, strategize, and invest on their logistics if  they wanted to shine and surpass 
the competition.   
There was no other way. To win the trust and sales from customers, e-commerce companies had to 
emphasize timely, reliable, convenient delivery as an integral element of  their business model for cre-
ating for customers the most rewarding shopping experience. Accordingly, many of  these online 
stores guaranteed delivery time, similar to Amazon’s same-day delivery, as a leading edge practice to 
win customers over the competition, in particular those with traditional brick-and-mortar retail 
stores. Nonetheless, for many Amazon wannabes, it became another wishful-thinking story, failing to 
deliver on their big promises. The truth of  the matter is that the complex nature of  last-mile logistics 
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in the business operations of  e-commerce companies imposed mammoth challenges on require-
ments for third-party logistics (3PLs) services. Concerns were raised by 3PLs not just in their capabil-
ities to move big-size orders at a minimal cost but in moving a soaring number of  frequent, small-
size orders for diverse types of  items to a wide range of  destinations. These limitations and others 
factored to performance gaps in shipping and higher-than-intended logistics costs. And if  that was 
not enough, 3PLs became troubled with the high number of  failed deliveries due to customers who 
were not at the door when the order was delivered, on top of  the high percentage of  product returns 
(a cost that many times is not considered), the unfavorable traffic congestion in high density urban 
areas, the long line of  enforceable and sometimes unexpected local shipping regulations and fees, 
plus the often-ignored wider-coverage capability for delivering orders to customer in rural areas 
(Gevaers, Van de Voorde, & Vanelslander, 2011), not taking into account other factors that service 
providers needed to consider for planning deliveries (e.g., the size and shape of  a country).   
To counter these types of  challenges and optimize a customer’s buying experience, a number of  e-
commerce sites and shipping companies introduced and implemented a variety of  novel technology 
approaches, each tailored to their distinctive situation. On top of  the list was the application of  track-
and-trace technology, so as to increase the visibility of  products and orders across a supply chain. 
Another attractive technology that seemed to catch the eyes of  many players in the e-commerce in-
dustry consisted of  analytics software capable of  planning the most efficient of  routes for when de-
livering orders to customers. These two technologies among others were regarded by experts at the 
time as a ‘must-have’ means to e-commerce-driven supply chains to deliver superior customer ser-
vice. 
In attempting to evade the shipping concerns of  e-commerce companies, 3PLs strategically began to 
study their customers/partners’ requisites for last-mile logistics, including processes and musts and, 
from data gathered, instituted automatic pick-up/drop-off  points at dense and convenient-to-access 
areas where online shoppers could come in-person and collect their parcels by entering a pin code via 
SMS message or email provided to them by the shipping companies. While smaller e-commerce retail 
operations highly valued the idea of  outsourcing 3PLs to manage their last-mile logistics and avoid 
the huge costs for investing and maintaining their own fleets of  trucks and warehouses, especially 
during those business cycles and seasons when sale volumes of  products were lower, some retail gi-
ants like Amazon, Apple, and Walmart found innovative means to assume responsibility of  the last-
mile delivery, and in so doing secured a sizably greater control of  quality for customer services pro-
vided through e-commerce channels. Nevertheless, even with how much control they envisaged hav-
ing, these retail giants, at least in the short run, relied on parcel delivery partners like FedEx, DHL, 
and UPS as well as smaller, in-country 3PLs too before their own truck fleets could grow and achieve 
targeted coverage for product deliveries with the outmost of   intended cost efficiency (Cunnane 
2015). 
LAZADA VIETNAM: LAST-MILE OVERVIEW 
STRATEGIC ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING 
In order to become more acclimated with the new business environment in Southeast Asia, Lazada 
built experienced regional strategy teams designed in-mind to study and analyze how to better im-
plement last-mile logistics, specifically the critical functions of  their order fulfillment like warehous-
ing, in-house transport, and 3PL-partner relationship management. To acquire this knowledge, 
benchmark studies were conducted by these teams across the six countries where Lazada operated. 
From analysis gathered and subsequent discussions and decisions, best practices were rolled out at 
specific Lazada locations as required. These brainstorm sessions were particularly helpful as a mas-
termind source of  new ideas where members belonging to these teams could learn from each other, 
and from lessons learnt they could launch strategies for improving customer service, aiming towards 
making that last mile in delivering orders to customers as successful as possible.  
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At the regional level, what team members discussed was a strategy for better management of  the in-
ventory in order to centralize stocks from different warehouses across countries in the region into 
fewer locations, so as, for example, not to keep six similar amounts of  the same inventory in one 
country, specifically for slow-selling inventory in long-tail operations. This radical strategy to central-
ize inventory would have to be started in countries such as Singapore and Malaysia where border-
crossing was easier and then proceed afterwards to Thailand and similar countries in the region 
where border crossing was not as simple. In view of  what would be a very uncooperative business 
environment with little transparency and huge decoupling challenges for the e-commerce operations 
of  Lazada, the problem became more complicated when looking at the situation in Vietnam where 
the custom processes were costly and lengthy, one which made it hard to impossible to deliver the 
orders on time from a centralized warehouse in the region. In addition, the disparity in the naming 
convention for a stock-keeping unit (SKU) of  the same exact product across respective countries was 
another constraint, requiring from Lazada a thorough, major overhaul for standardizing their product 
codes if  they wanted to successfully fly with the one central warehouse location idea. Much thought 
was given by the management of  Lazada. Would it be feasible for the company to implement the one 
central location for managing the inventory in a region? After careful consideration, a more practical 
move was taken by Lazada to lower the high and redundant inventory costs at individual country 
branches. The online retailer decided to implement a combination marketplace model alongside a 
retail model in fulfilling customers’ orders. Lazada would leave the long-tail products, i.e., those items 
that were not sold regularly, to local merchants, so that Lazada did not have to keep unnecessary in-
ventory while retaining in stock only those fast-moving, lower holding-cost products, which normally 
they could purchase in bulk quantities from suppliers and receive higher discounts.   
At national level, Lazada Vietnam recognized that in order to survive in a market with fierce competi-
tion and demanding customers like Vietnam, it was imperative to deliver a consistently superior cus-
tomer experience. For that reason as well as to support the young, enterprising company in its efforts 
to expand to other regions in the country, the top priority for Lazada Vietnam essentially became one 
towards investing heavily in infrastructure and facilities, specifically in its own warehouses and fleet 
of  trucks. At the time, according to Mr. Fabian Wandt, Head of  Retail Procurement, Marketplace 
Operations, and Content Production for Lazada Vietnam, “Local 3PLs cannot catch up with the re-
quired speed to agilely adjust to Lazada’s order fulfillment processes. Hence, the focus for Lazada 
should be to build its own fleet in parallel with the use of  3PLs. We have already deployed our own 
drivers in Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi for the last-mile delivery operations and in the long-term, our 
goal will be to reach customers everywhere, even in the smaller towns”. Another reason for Lazada in 
establishing in-house last-mile logistics was to avoid making easy entrance for competitors by unwise-
ly sharing their inside knowledge to possibly untrustworthy local service providers who would also 
service the competition. Having warehouses near the customer base was also necessary to facilitate 
quick and effective last-mile delivery. The big picture strategy for Lazada was to have one major 
warehouse in Ho Chi Minh City, in a section of  town that was considered safe, affordable, and easily 
accessible from major highways. Subsequently, a network of  smaller warehouses would be built up in 
various cities and remote areas to store fast-moving products. The plan of  the company was to have 
a minimum of  three warehouses, one in each of  the three major regions of  Vietnam by 2015 with a 
combined storage space of  more than 10,000 square meters, split mainly between Ho Chi Minh City 
and Hanoi. Besides these strategies, Lazada also aimed for expanding their merchant network in Vi-
etnam so that orders to Lazada customers would be flexibly supported by various dependable part-
ner-suppliers offering similar products all across the country, thereby feasibly making possible same-
day delivery with no or minimal delivery costs.   
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LAST-MILE CURRENT OPERATIONS 
1. Distribution of  customers 
As was indicated by Lazada’s chief  operating officer, Mr. Gerald Glauerdt, the percentage of  
target customers between rural and urban areas for the company was around fifty/fifty. In 
view of  that, the German e-commerce company saw great opportunities in expanding its 
business to the rural market where the purchase basket size was larger, and customers were 
relatively more loyal. The chief  operating officer went further to give an explanation for 
Lazada’s logic to go after this new market, “since the internet was penetrating in these rural 
areas, customers were offered a wider range of  choices of  products to buy, more than what 
they could find at their local stores.” What appeared to be a promising opportunity at first 
glance, it was not when reflecting on the many obstacles that would stand in Lazada’s way to 
reach out effectively to these customers considering the higher logistics costs invested for 
fulfilling each order, which, when all was said and done, not only drained all of  their profit 
margin but left it with a loss. To better illustrate this point, the average value for an order at 
Lazada was around $30 and given the profit margin of  10%, the company would normally 
make $3 profit per order. Regrettably, the shipping costs to rural areas were about $5 on av-
erage, much higher than when making the same type of  deliveries to customers in urban are-
as and much more than was laid in the plan for Lazada to make a fair profit, leaving typically 
the company with a loss of  $2 per order. Therefore, in order to develop sustainably in the 
future and effectively reach out to customers in rural areas, Lazada had to find ways to de-
velop more efficient logistics systems and reduce the logistics costs while at the same time 
improved the last-mile customer service.     
2. Facilities and infrastructure 
For supporting its last-mile delivery, Lazada at the time operated one large warehouse and 
two transportation hubs in Ho Chi Minh City along with other seven hubs across in Vietnam 
in Can Tho, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau, Danang, Hanoi, and Hai Phong. These hubs 
were relatively small with no considerable investment on information/computer technology 
(ICT) and acted initially as a drop-off  point for last-mile handling and product returns. 
However, Lazada began to use these hubs as interacting points where customers could seek 
advice and guidance on how to use their purchased items properly, to place their complaints, 
and to receive their cash back immediately if  they did not want the product or make an ex-
change. Another advantage for having these kinds of  facilities was to conveniently give cus-
tomers self-pick-up options, which would save them as well as Lazada the shipping costs. 
The aim of  Lazada Vietnam was to offer customers these offline options as they were transi-
tioning to online shopping. 
3. Lazada Vietnam’s “Last-mile” model 
The focus for Lazada was to first enter the region of  South Vietnam and then expand later 
to other regions with a nationwide delivery service. At that time, the average number of  daily 
orders at Lazada ranged from 2,000 - 6,000, which was roughly a gross of  15-30% of  the 
available market. In other words, there was a huge potential for many more customers, and 
as such many more orders would have to be fulfilled by the company’s fleet and shipping 
partners each day. Consequently, for ease of  delivery scheduling and shipping fee calculation, 
the company divided the geographic territory of  Vietnam into six destination zones, assign-
ing a different payment fee for each zone. However, according to a new shipping fee policy 
that would take effect starting on April 2015, shipping for orders with total payment of  
150,000 VND or more would be free of  charge, except for bulky/special items which were 
subject to surcharges. Besides, to improve customer experiences, Lazada also provided an es-
timate of  delivery time specific to each province in Vietnam and tried its best to fulfill the 
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orders within that target. As such, the expected lead time for normal delivery would vary 
from same day shipping (if  in HCMC or Hanoi) to approximately eight days depending on 
where the customer was located, while the maximum time that a customer could expect re-
ceiving an order was 14 days. Notwithstanding, given the current capacity and facilities of  
the company, for delivering consistently a positive customer experience across locations in 
the country was extremely costly for Lazada, chiefly because everything that went to the 
north region had to be shipped by air. Elaborating on Lazada’s predicament to on-time de-
livery to every customer in Vietnam, Mr. Fabian indicated “Vietnamese people are quite sen-
sitive to lead time, especially in metro areas, and we want people in Hanoi to have the same 
experience”. He also referred to the competition as another reason for incurring more ship-
ping costs by citing the case of  Thegioididong, a brick-and click electronic store with more 
than 250 stores in Vietnam offering an amazing lead time of  3 hours for online purchases. 
Soon after, Lazada was planning to solve this problem by opening a warehouse in Hanoi.  
The method and speed at which orders at Lazada were processed also differed among the 
two operation models, inventory/retail and marketplace. For the former, inventory/retail 
model, everything had to go via the company’s warehouse. If  the product being ordered was 
cross-stocked with the supplier, Lazada would send a driver to the supplier’s’ site to pick it 
up, pack it, prepare an invoice, and ship it to the customer at once. In case the product was 
in stock at the warehouse, the process was even quicker with less than 20 minutes to fulfill 
the order. For the marketplace model, the lead time was longer than with the retail/inventory 
model as more steps were needed to be performed to deliver an order to customer. None-
theless, with day-to-day interaction along with training of  the merchants/suppliers, Lazada 
Vietnam was able to decrease end-to-end lead time via the marketplace model. The company 
had a daily delivery schedule for its merchants, i.e., instructions on what to do and by which 
time, so that when the 3PL express carriers came, the products were available for pick up 
and shipping to Lazada customers. For instance, the merchants had to look at Lazada’s order 
system between 11 AM-12 PM each day to confirm all the orders placed during the previous 
hours, pack products, and make sure they were ready for pick up before 3 PM. If  the sched-
ule was not met by a merchant, the customer service team at Lazada would call the merchant 
and check whether anything went wrong. In the event that something went wrong, then 
Lazada would assist the merchant so that it could meet the cut-off  time. 
4. The use of  an in-house transportation fleet versus transportation partners 
At the beginning, 3PL companies played a dominant role in the delivery of  last-mile logistics 
for Lazada. While the e-commerce company’s own fleet was used predominantly for the re-
tail/inventory model in areas where the transportation hubs were located, and this handling 
about 55-60% of  the orders, 3PLs partners undertook the delivery of  orders for both mod-
els on a broader nationwide scale. However, the problem with an express carrier was that 
money-wise a single 3PL partner did not have the best rates for all destinations and for all 
items. Therefore, Lazada had to contract with many shippers and from those contracted 
choose the best of  the bunch fulfilling specific orders. Selecting the best carrier was always a 
bit tricky and time consuming. Looking ahead, the company foresaw a roll out of  its own 
fleet of  trucks to do pickups from all the merchants and bring them to strategically-located 
central sorting hubs where they could scan the order to determine the most cost-efficient 
means to deliver. When all was said and done, the long-term goal of  Lazada was to ensure 
using only the most capable last mile service providers which could match Lazada’s require-
ments to enable the best-in-class customer service, take advantage of  promotions, and po-
tentially reduce the overall shipping costs. 
In addition, the decision to invest in its own fleet of  trucks was partly because other existing 
3PL partners failed in one way or another:   
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● Vietnam Post (VN Post): VN Post was the biggest local mail/package delivery company 
and the only service provider able to service all areas in Vietnam, including rural locations 
where most of  the potential customers in Vietnam were located. Despite VN Post’s advanta-
geous competitive position, the level of  IT implementation was extremely low, processing 
most of  the information for orders manually. As a consequence of  this shortcoming, it was 
very difficult for the company to plan for hundreds of  pick-ups a day, even when it had 
good equipment in terms of  trucks. All processes of  VN Post were carried out manually, 
and therefore, it could take from one to two weeks to just receive a notification that the or-
der was delivered and received by the customer.  
● Giaohangnhanh (GHN): GHN was a new start-up 3PL company founded by a former IT 
employee of  Thegioididong. With a fountain of  knowledge from this expert, the company 
had quite an insightful analysis view into the needs for companies in the e-commerce indus-
try and a practical understanding of  common issues for local 3PLs. The best aspect of  this 
carrier was that it had a well-developed and easy-to-connect IT system that was compatible 
with the one being implemented by Lazada and as such offering real-time synchronization 
for better delivery coordination and order tracking. However, the problem of  GHN after its 
rapid expansion from 10 to 50 areas in only one year of  operation was that the shipping 
company decided to slow down with its plan to build up its volume capacity and coverage 
outside big cities mainly to make sure the business ran profitably. At its current pace, it could 
take GHN at least 2 to 3 years to develop the infrastructure to reach destinations all over Vi-
etnam.  
● Smaller carriers: these companies were small scale, family operations and used mostly mo-
torbikes for delivering small-sized items in the cities. Although many of  them had their own 
IT systems, these 3PL operations invested more towards their own planning when it came to 
the delivery schedules and route planning and not volume capacity. Lazada still contracted 
with a number of  these dime-by-the-dozen players to deliver orders for small merchants-
partners and for pick-up points that only had one or two items.  
LAZADA VIETNAM: LOOKING AHEAD AT IMPROVING THE LAST-
MILE 
Thinking through the logistics complexity for delivering packages in the e-commerce market of  Vi-
etnam, intensified by the big opportunities and open doors available to new domestic and interna-
tional e-commerce companies looking for abundant and promising markets like Vietnam where they 
could step in and dominate, Lazada understood that it needed to take action as soon as possible in 
building customers’ trust and loyalty through superior last-mile service. As such, the top priority of  
Lazada was to get the lead time down to a competitive minimum, one acceptable by local customers, 
and according to Mr. Fabian, the company was employing various methods for achieving this objec-
tive.  
Internally, Lazada would accelerate its investments in warehouse infrastructure and in the rollouts of  
new hubs, which were done only conservatively in areas where they saw distinctly sustainable order 
volumes. By the end of  2014, the company would bring into operations a new warehouse in Hanoi, 
which would help them serve customers in the north more effectively and save potential shipping 
costs. By having stock close to this customer base, Lazada would be able to offer same day delivery in 
Hanoi, similarly to what they were doing in Ho Chi Minh City. Furthermore, the company would 
focus on investing in information technology, equipping its drivers with hand-held devices to update 
the delivery status of  orders in real time. This would help Lazada keep track of  shipments, which 
could be used as evidence for resolving disputes with customers when complaints arose. Further-
more, IT would be used to handle operations in the marketplace model, including managing order 
pick-ups at the suppliers’ sites, deliveries to sorting hubs, and the dispatching of  the order to the final 
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destination, either by 3PL or by their own fleet. Lastly, and most significant, customer service training 
had to be provided to drivers in how to conduct themselves properly when interacting with custom-
ers and partners, not an easy task to do.   
Reflecting on how to better integrate transportation and merchant partners together with how to 
support Lazada in implementing a more effective last-mile strategy, Mr. Fabian pointed out that it 
was very tricky and costly for them to equip thousands of  their drivers with electronic devices to 
track the shipping process. Lazada had discussed with their partners about a way to improve the visi-
bility of  the delivery process, but still this step required a huge investment from all parties. The part-
ners of  Lazada Vietnam knew this new German company in the e-commerce scene in Vietnam was 
quickly expanding, becoming a more significant player, one with grander popularity for attracting 
local customers to purchase products time and time again, and one with many potential business op-
portunities ahead. As such, the concerns and interests of  Lazada Vietnam had to be taken more seri-
ously by 3PL companies. At first, this would require for Lazada and its partners to better integrate, to 
connect their information systems with an Application Programming Interface (API), which allowed 
for automatic updates across systems whenever a party made a change in its own system and thus, 
provided real-time visibility across collaborating companies.  .  
With respect to its merchants and its marketplace model, Lazada was working hard to make im-
provements on a new mobile operating system called Seller Center as well as keeping up with some 
of  the latest customer-focused Smartphone trends. Lazada had formerly launched Android-based 
Seller Center applications to help merchants manage their shops everywhere and in the future would 
be introducing similar applications for IOS systems. This technology would offer many valuable uses. 
For example, when a merchant accepted an order, an automatic message would be sent to the 3PLs 
informing them about a pending order ready for pick-up. It would take the company some time to 
make the communications between their systems and partners’ systems fully integrated. Moreover, 
the company was developing a feature which would recognize the online shopper’s location and re-
ferred them to the closest merchant. 
Finding that one right strategy or set of  strategies to help successfully transform the last-mile logis-
tics of  Lazada Vietnam and guarantee complete customer satisfaction in the demanding eyes of  the 
Vietnamese online shoppers appeared so close, but in reality it was a thousand miles away. Valuable 
direction would be called for from an expert team like yours to help Lazada Vietnam successfully 
move forward.  
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